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Regional economic integration is both a deregulatory project, involving the removal of 
barriers  to  the  movement  of  goods  and  services,  as  well  as  a  re-regulatory  project, 
involving  the  adoption  of common  economic,  social,  and  environmental  standards  to 
enable the market to function. The removal of trade barriers can be achieved by bilateral 
or  multilateral  agreements.  However,  the  adoption  of  common  rules  requires  the 
delegation of agenda-setting and enforcement to a supranational body to resolve policy 
coordination  problems  and  enable  states  to  credibly  commit  to  implement  market 
integration.  The  lesson  from  the  experience  of  the  European  Union  is  that  such 
delegation, if designed carefully, need not threaten national sovereignty, which is clearly 
a  fear  in  East  Asia.  A  supranational  executive  can  be  tightly  controlled  by  the 
governments if (i) unanimity is required for any decision to delegate in a particular policy 
area, (ii) the governments are equally represented in the executive body, and (iii) there 
are high decision-making thresholds and checks and balances for the adoption of policy 
proposals  by  the  supranational  body.  Such  a  design  requires  a  certain  degree  of 
preference  convergence  among  the  governments  to  enable  the  initial  delegation 
decision to take place by unanimous agreement. It also requires the establishment of an 
equitable system of representation and decision-making, which allows each state a fair 
chance  to  influence  policy  outcomes.  Preferences  may  not  yet  have  converged 
sufficiently in East Asia, but a system of representation can be designed which would 
allow states to be represented equitably in a supranational decision-making structure in 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Regional economic integration is both a deregulatory project, involving the removal of 
barriers  to  the  movement  of  goods  and  services,  as  well  as  a  re-regulatory  project, 
involving the adoption of some common economic, social, and environmental standards. 
The removal of trade barriers can be achieved by bilateral agreements or unanimous 
multilateral  deals  between  participating  countries,  as  the  dense  network  of  trade 
agreements in East Asia demonstrates. However, the adoption of common rules on how 
a  market  should  work—such  as  competition  rules,  minimum  product  standards, 
environmental rules—requires the delegation of agenda-setting and enforcement powers 
to an independent body. Put another way, regional integration is unlikely to progress 
from free trade to genuine market integration without a certain degree of delegation. 
 
Such delegation, as part of a package deal to foster market integration, has thus far 
been resisted by governments in East Asia. There are many reasons why sovereign 
states in this region have resisted this step. One reason is the fear that delegation to a 
supranational body, like the  European Union  (EU) Commission, would lead to policy 
outputs beyond the intentions of the governments. Such a step would compromise the 
tightly protected national sovereignty of these states. East Asia is very different from 
Europe,  where  citizens  and  state  officials  share  a  post-national  conception  of 
sovereignty, so the standard reasoning goes.  
 
This paper challenges this reasoning. For a start, identities in Europe are not so different 
from those in Asia. In both regions, governments primarily seek to protect their national 
interests.  Above  all,  delegation  to  an  independent  body,  if  designed  carefully,  can 
promote  the  collective  interests  of  states  rather  than  undermine  the  sovereignty  of 
states. Specifically, policy drift by an independent executive beyond the intentions of the 
governments  can  be  limited  by  (i)  the  requirement  that  unanimity  is  needed  for  any 
power to be delegated, (ii) the representation of all states in the independent body, and 
(iii)  high  decision-making  thresholds  and  checks  and  balances  for  the  adoption  of 
proposals by the independent body. 
 
There are two pre-requisites for such an institutional design. First, there needs to be a 
degree  of  preference  convergence  among  the  states  to  enable  an  initial  decision  to 
delegate to be made unanimously. Second, an equitable design of representation and 
decision-making in the central institutions needs to be invented, under which each state 
has a fair chance to influence policy outcomes and also to block any policy which they 
feel threatens a critical national interest. Have preferences converged in East Asia? And, 
can an equitable system of representation be designed in a region with such disparities 
in population and economic size? 
 
To make the case that regional economic integration in East Asia can be promoted by 
the careful institutional design of delegation and representation, the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 explains how regional economic integration is primarily an exercise 
in market regulation, and how delegating agenda-setting and enforcement is critical for 
the promotion of market integration. Section 3 explains how institutional mechanisms 




Section 4 then discusses whether state preferences are sufficiently convergent in East 
Asia for such delegation to take place. Section 5 turns to the design of representation in 
a  potential  East  Asian  Economic  Union.  Finally,  Section  6  looks  at  the  current 




2.  Regional Economic Integration as a Regulatory Project 
 
A free trade area involves the removal of barriers to trade for a particular set of goods or 
services,  via  the  reduction  or  abolition  of  import  tariffs  and  quotas.  All  free  trade 
agreements  exclude  particular  sectors  of  the  economy.  In  contrast, genuine  regional 
economic integration, for example in the European single market, involves the removal 
of all barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and labor, as well as the 
implementation of a set of common regulations to enable markets to function efficiently 
and effectively (European Commission 1985). 
   
Setting  up  a  single  market  beyond  the  nation  state  consequently  involves  both 
deregulation as well as re-regulation. There are three elements of the deregulatory side 
of a single market program. The first element relates to the primary obligations of a 
single market program, which force governments to abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on the free movement of goods, services, and capital. This includes removing barriers 
such as capital controls, import quotas, and customs duties.  
 
The second element is the principle of mutual recognition. This principle means that if a 
good or service can legally be sold in one state in a market then it can legally be sold in 
all other states as well. This principle is central to the operation of the European single 
market, although it applies more clearly to the free movement of goods than to the free 
movement of services. 
 
The third element is the harmonization of common standards, which in turn leads to the 
replacement  of  a  network  of  national  rules  with  a  single  set  of  common  rules.This 
harmonization can have a significant indirect deregulatory effect. For example, economic 
integration may require the establishment of a common principle of non-discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality in the awarding of public procurement contracts or in the 
award  of  working  contracts  and  the  treatment  of  workers  (if  the  free  movement  of 
persons is included). Such rules would force the liberalization of large sectors of the 
economy as well as industrial relations and workers‘ rights. Economic integration may 
also include common rules governing state assistance to the private sector to create a 
level  playing  field  between  the  states.  Such  rules  would  lead  to  the  privatization  of 
nationalized industries and the opening up of national champions to competition from 
international firms. 
 
On the other hand, economic integration beyond the adoption of common standards 
involves re-regulation of the market (Dehousse 1992, Majone 1996). To enable goods 
and services to circulate, common product regulations need to be adopted, such as 
product  safety  standards,  consumer  health  standards,  product  labeling  rules,  and 




regulations need to be adopted to avoid a race to the bottom in social and environmental 
standards as a result of the application of mutual recognition, as states compete to cut 
the costs for their own industries to attract foreign direct investment (Baldwin 2009). At a 
bare minimum, these process regulations would include common rules on health and 
safety  at  work,  and  controls  on  environmental  pollution  in  the  production  process. 
Process  standards  might  also  be  adopted  to  cover  workers  rights,  such  as  working 
conditions, working hours, parental leave, and workers‘ consultation rights. 
 
How should these common regulations be made? According to the normative theory of 
regulation,  the  aim  of  market  regulation  should  be  to  promote  the  public  interest 
(Mitnick 1980,  Sunstein  1990).  In  neo-classical  economic  theory,  free  markets  are 
naturally pareto-efficient, but in the real world there are numerous market failures and 
regulation  should  be  used  primarily  to  correct  these  failures.  For  example,  technical 
standards  enable  consumers  to  gain  information  about  the  quality  of  products; 
environmental standards reduce the adverse effects (negative externalities) of market 
transactions on individuals not participating in the transactions; and competition policies 
prevent monopolistic markets, market distortions, and anti-competitive practices. If these 
sorts  of  policies  are  made  through  traditional  representative  institutions  via  majority 
decisions—such as a council of states or a supranational assembly deciding by majority 
rule—these policies are likely to be redistributive rather than pareto-improving.  
 
Applying  this  logic  to  regional  economic  integration,  most  scholars  advocate  the 
delegation of agenda-setting and enforcement to an independent body (Moravcsik 1998, 
1999; Pollack 1997, 2003; Mattli 1999). First, delegating agenda-setting power facilitates 
the  resolution  of  a  coordination  dilemma  in  the  adoption  of  common  regulatory 
standards. This intuition is illustrated in Figure 1. The scenario here represents a conflict 
between two states about what common regulatory standard to adopt in a single market. 
State A already applies a high standard (e.g., a high level of environmental protection), 
whereas State B applies a low standard. The negotiation is a coordination game since 
two possible equilibria exist: one with a common high standard, and one with a common 
low standard. Both states benefit from any agreement more than they would from no 
agreement, as any common standard would enable a single market to function in that 
particular  sector,  whereas  no  agreement  would  mean  that  a  market  could  not  exist. 
Nevertheless,  the  states  cannot  reach  agreement,  as  both  states  would  like  their 
domestic  standard  to  be  applied  at  the  supranational  level.  In  this  situation,  an 
independent  agenda-setter  helps  resolve  the  dilemma  by  working  out  which  set  of 
regulations are best to correct potential market failures, and then proposing these rules 













Figure 1: Regional Market Regulation as a Coordination Game 
 








































 A = €10 million 




 A = €0 million 








 A = €0 million 




 A = €6 million 
 B = €10 million 
Note: Each cell in the box shows the pay-offs for each state if that set of common standards 
were agreed upon. Cell 1 represents the pay-offs  (in millions of euros)  to each state of 
common  high  standards,  cell  3  represents  the  hypothetical  pay-offs  of  common  low 
standards. Cells 2 and 4 represent the pay-offs of the status-quo, where State A continues to 
apply high standards while State B continues to apply low standards. 
Source: Author‘s calculations.  
 
In building the European single market the European Union often faced this problem, for 
example,  in  the  adoption  of  common  car  emissions  standards  or  health  and  safety 
standards. In many cases, the European Commission was able to propose a common 
set of standards that were well above the average levels applied domestically by the 
European  Union  states,  which  were  then  adopted  as  the  harmonized  rules  for  the 
European  Union  single  market  since  agreement  on  any  common  standard  was 
preferable  to  no  economic  integration.  Nevertheless,  this  coordination  logic  worked 
better on product regulations, such as labeling and packaging rules, than on process 
regulations, such as labor market rules (Scharpf 1996). This is because while common 
product  standards  are  essential  for  the  exchange  of goods  and  services  in  a  single 
market,  common  standards  in  the  production  process  are  not  essential  for  a  single 
market to function. Also, conflicts over product standards tend to be far less contentious 
(with less redistributive consequences for states and social groups), than conflicts over 
process standards, such as worker protection rules or common labor market practices. 
As  a  result,  the  European  Union  has  been  far  more  successful  in  the  adoption  of 
common product rules than in the adoption of common process rules. 
 
Second,  delegating  enforcement  and  oversight  of  policy  implementation  to  an 
independent  body  resolves  another  type  of  collective  action  problem—a  prisoners‘ 
dilemma. This is illustrated in Figure 2. In the scenario here, two states have agreed to a 
common  set  of  rules  for  economic  integration.  Each  state  is  sovereign,  though,  in 
deciding whether to implement the common rules. On the one hand, each state faces 
some cost for implementing the rules, since applying the rules would open up domestic 
markets to more competition from goods suppliers and service providers from the other 




markets. Even if the benefits for one state of the other state opening its markets are 
greater  than  the  costs  of  opening  up  its  own  market,  there  is  a  collective  action 
problem because  the  best  response  of  each  state  is  not  to  apply  the  rules,  in  the 
expectation that the other state will be doing the same. The likely outcome is that both 
states will fail to implement the common agreement. 
 
Figure 2: Enforcement of Regional Economic Integration  
as a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 




















 A = €0 million 




 A = €+7 million 








 A = -€3 million 




 A = +€4 million 
 B = +€4 million 
Note: Each cell in the box shows the pay-off for each state of a certain combination of actions. 
Cell 1 represents the pay-off (in millions of euros) to each state if neither state implements the 
common rules, cell 2 represents the hypothetical pay-offs if State B implements the rules whereas 
State A fails to implement the rules. Cell 3 represents the reverse situation, and cell 4 represents 
the pay-offs if both states implement the rules. 
Source: Author‘s calculations.  
 
 
One way of resolving this problem is to delegate the enforcement of the agreed rules to 
an independent actor. This changes the cost–benefit calculations of each state, as each 
state  is  then  aware  that  they  could  be  punished  for  failing  to  apply  the  rules.  For 
example, in the European Union context, the Treaty of Rome delegated responsibility to 
the European Commission for (i) monitoring the enforcement of the collective rules, and 
(ii) referring any state which breached the rules to the European Court of Justice. A 
similar  logic  applies  in  the  operation  of  the  Dispute  Panels  of  the  World  Trade 
Organization.  In  this  way,  the  delegation  of  oversight  and  enforcement  to  an 
independent body is a powerful commitment device as each state is then aware that 
once an agreement has been reached on a new set of common regulations, there is a 
high likelihood that all states will have to apply these rules.  
 
 
3.  Institutional Mechanisms to Limit Policy Drift by a 
Supranational Executive 
 
Against  this  normative  theory,  the  positive  theory  of  regulation  suggests  that 
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(Stigler 1971). Independent regulatory agencies are likely to have their own institutional 
interests and policy preferences, which might not be identical to the preferences of their 
principals.  For  example,  agencies  can  try  to  increase  their  influence  in  the  policy 
process. They can also seek larger budgets or attempt to maximize their independence 
from political control. These assumptions lead to a different set of conclusions about how 
regulation  should  be  made.  In  this  view,  independent  regulators  are  likely  to  try  to 
achieve policies that are closer to their own preferences or institutional interests, which 
will then produce policy winners and losers, rather than a collectively pareto-efficient or 
pareto-improving outcome. 
 
Delegating agenda-setting and enforcement powers might consequently lead to policy 
drift.  An  example  of  how  this  might  happen  in  the  process  of  regional  economic 
integration is illustrated in Figure 3. In this scenario there is a two-dimensional policy 
space  in  which  there  are  three  governments  with  ideal  points  at  A,  B,  and  C. 
A regulatory agency, such as the European Union Commission, prefers a high level of 
regulation and seeks to promote further economic integration. Hence, it is located in the 
top-left section of the figure. Each government and agency tries to secure a policy which 
is  as  close  as  possible  to  its  ideal  point.  The  governments  agree  on  a  package  of 
legislation,  such  as  the  single  market  program,  at  position X,  which  is  a  unanimous 
compromise agreement. The governments then agree to delegate responsibility to the 
agency to implement the package deal, via the initiative of secondary regulation and via 
the oversight of the implementation of primary rules in the package by the governments. 
With these powers, the agency is able to shape the final policy outcome and, in fact, can 
move the final policy as far as position Y. Governments A and B prefer this new policy to 
the  original  deal  because  Y  is  closer  to  their  ideal  points  than  X.  But  all  three 
governments will block any moves further towards the agency‘s ideal point, as any policy 
in this direction would be less attractive to all the governments than position Y. The 
result, then, is that the agency has a certain degree of discretion to change the original 
policy outcome within the constraints of the preference structure of the delegators.  
 














              
 
 




For  example,  this  is  how  some  scholars  have  interpreted  the  relations  between 
European Union governments and the European Commission in the late 1980s during 
the process of implementing the European Union single market (Garrett and Weingast 
1993, Pollack 2003). At that time, the Commission, led by Jacques Delors, had been 
delegated responsibility to propose approximately 300 pieces of legislation to complete 
the  single  market  by  the  end  of  1992,  which  the  European  Union  governments  had 
committed  themselves  to  do  in  the  Single  European  Act  in  1986.  The  Delors 
Commission favored a higher level of economic integration and more harmonization of 
social and environmental standards than some governments were willing to accept, most 
notably Margaret Thatcher‘s conservative government in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
original unanimous package deal in the Single European Act represented a relatively 
free market program, with only minor concessions towards a ―Social Europe‖ to ensure 
support from social democratic governments, such as France and Spain, and very little 
in terms of common environmental standards, which the UK, Italy, and several other 
states feared would raise costs for businesses in Europe relative to the United States 
(US)  and  Asia.  Nevertheless,  the  independent  agenda-setting  powers  of  the 
Commission,  backed  by  the  use  of  qualified-majority  voting  (QMV)  in  the  European 
Union Council for the adoption of secondary legislation, meant that the European Union 
adopted  more  social  regulations  and  higher  environmental  standards  than  many 
commentators had predicted when the Single European Act was signed (Tsebelis 1994, 
Pierson 1996, Tsebelis and Kalandrakis 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, this sort of policy drift can usually be predicted and institutions can be 
designed to limit the extent of such drift (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). For example, 
the  structure  of  representation  in  an  agency  can  be  designed  to  minimize  the  gap 
between the preferences of the principals and the agent, giving each of the principals a 
seat on the executive board of the agency. Similarly, the procedure for appointing the 
head  of the  agency  can  be  designed  to  maximize  the  consensus  for  the  candidate, 
through an oversized-majority procedure or through the approval of multiple institutions. 
Principals can also gather information on the performance of the agent, and force the 
agent to disclose information in public hearings (known as a ―police patrol‖ oversight 
procedure). Alternatively, principals can use private interest groups to do the monitoring 
for them, by providing for judicial review of the agent‘s actions and easy access to the 
courts for individuals or firms who are affected by regulations (known as a ―fire alarm‖ 
oversight procedure). The result of these controls is a restriction of the ability of an agent 
to move from the original policy intention. 
 
In  the  European  Union  context,  for  example,  the  institutional  framework  has  been 
carefully  designed  to  limit  the  possibility  that  the  Commission  will  act  as  a  runaway 
bureaucracy  (Moravcsik 1998).  The  European  Union  governments  have  employed  a 
classic police-patrol mechanism, via a system of committees of national representatives 
(known  as  ―comitology‖),  which  monitors  the  implementation  decisions  of  the 
Commission. The European Union also uses a classic fire-alarm mechanism, via the 
access  of  governments  and  interest  groups  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  to 
challenge the decisions and legislative proposals of the Commission.  
 
However,  three  other  institutional  design  decisions  are  far  more  significant  in 




decision  to  delegate  power  is  taken  by  a  unanimous  intergovernmental  decision. 
Amendment  of  the  European  Union  treaty  is  required  to  either  add  a  new  policy 
competence to the European Union or to change decision-making in a policy area from 
unanimity amongst the governments to QMV, which would give genuine independent 
agenda-setting  power  to  the  Commission.  Reform  of  the  treaty  requires  unanimous 
agreement by the governments—at the level of heads of state and government—as well 
as national ratification, either by a parliamentary vote or a national referendum, or both. 
This is a high threshold for delegating any new powers to the Commission.  
 
This threshold suggests three things about delegation in the European Union: (i) there is 
already a high level of political consensus amongst the European Union member states 
in all the policy areas where the Commission has independent agenda-setting power; (ii) 
any  potential  losers  from  delegation  could  demand  a  side-payment  in  the  original 
package  deal  (Franchino 2007);  and  (iii)  highly  sensitive  or  politically  salient  issues 
remain largely intergovernmental in nature, as there is insufficient consensus to enable 
agenda-setting to be delegated on these issues. 
 
On  this  second  point,  side  payments  to  purchase  unanimous  support  for  a  market 
integration project could be in the form of hard cash from those states that expect to gain 
the most from market integration (the net exporters) to those states that expect to gain 
the least (the net importers). For example, when the Single European Act was signed in 
Europe, the periphery states—Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece—demanded a 
doubling of regional aid via the European Union budget as the price for signing up to the 
single market program, which they expected would benefit the core exporting states—
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the UK—more than the periphery states.  
 
Side-payments can also be policy trades in the original intergovernmental package deal. 
This  trade  involves  those  states  that  expect  to  gain  most  from  market  integration, 
allowing other states to add issues to the agenda which they feel promote their interests 
at  the  expense  of  the  net  exporting  states.  For  example,  the  Single  European  Act 
institutionalized a tradeoff between a center-right free market agenda for Europe and a 
social democratic policy of promoting a ―Social Europe.‖ As a result, the treaty ended up 
containing provisions for common social and environmental standards, covering both 
product standards as well as process standards (such as workers rights), which were 
well beyond the original intentions of the market liberals in Europe. 
 
On  the  third  point,  unanimous  agreement  at  the  highest  political  level  before  any 
delegation can take place means that intergovernmental decision-making still plays a 
significant  role  in  the  way  the  European  Union  works.  The  heads  of  state  and 
government, who meet in the European Council four times a year, set the medium- and 
long-term policy agenda of the European Union and play an essential role in resolving 
disputes. Intergovernmental bargaining also dominates negotiations over the European 
Union‘s  multi-annual  budget.  And,  inter-governmentalism,  in  the  form  of  consensus 
agreement  between  senior  cabinet  ministers (e.g.,  prime  ministers, foreign ministers, 
finance ministers, or interior ministers), is the dominant mode of decision-making in the 
fields  of  foreign  and  security  affairs,  economic  and  monetary  union,  and  police  and 
judicial cooperation. In other words, supranational delegation and decision-making only 




Europe‘s continental scale market. And, even within this set of policy issues, heads of 
state  and  government  are  involved  in  every  highly  salient  issue,  which  they  resolve 
through classic intergovernmental consensus-building and horse-trading. 
 
Second, the rules governing the election of, and representation in, the supranational 
executive  ensure  that  the  preferences  of  the  executive  are  close  to  those  of  the 
governments. Under the Rome Treaty design, the President of the Commission—the 
most  powerful  post  in  the  European  Union—was  chosen  by  unanimous  agreement 
amongst the heads of state and government of the European Union states. Since 1994, 
the  nominee  of  the governments  must  also  receive  the  backing  of  a  majority  in  the 
European Parliament. And since 2004, the governments can nominate a Commission 
President  by  QMV,  although  in  practice  they  try  to  reach  a  consensus.  These rules 
ensure that the governments are likely to choose a Commission President who they can 
work closely with and who shares their vision for the European Union. In this respect, 
Jacques Delors was the exception rather than the rule, in that all Commission Presidents 
before and since Delors have been far more consensual and less ambitious. Indeed, 
when Delors was chosen, Margaret Thatcher had forced the other member states to 
accept Delors over the more popular candidate at the time, Claude Cheysson, whom 
she  felt  was  less  economically  liberal  and  more  Euro-federalist  than  Delors.  Once 
appointed, however, Delors revealed his preferences to be further from Thatcher than 
she had anticipated. The three Commission Presidents since Delors—Santer, Prodi, and 
Barroso—have  been  less  willing  to  confront  the  big  member  states  in  major 
constitutional, policy, or budgetary battles. 
 
Regarding the other members of the Commission, there has always been at least one 
Commissioner per European Union member state, hence, replicating the preferences of 
the governments inside the European Union executive body. Under the Rome Treaty 
design, the large states—Germany, France, Italy, and the UK—had two Commissioners 
each  while  the  other  states  had  one  each. With  the  prospect  of  enlargement  of  the 
European  Union  to  25  states,  there  was  pressure  to  reduce  the  number  of 
Commissioners.  It  was  first  agreed  that  there  would  be  only  one  Commissioner  per 
member state, which was implemented in the Barroso Commission in 2005. Then, in the 
failed Constitution for Europe, it was proposed that the number of Commissioners should 
be less than the number of  European Union states. However, this became a salient 
issue  with  the  rejection  of the  Lisbon Treaty  in  a  referendum  in  Ireland,  where  Irish 
voters were concerned inter alia that they would lose a Commissioner. One result of the 
―No‖  vote  in Ireland is a new protocol between the governments  which ensures that 
every member states will retain a Commissioner. In other words, it has been very difficult 
for the European Union to move away from a model where representation of each state 
in the Commission ensures that the Commission‘s preferences are closely aligned to the 
preferences of the European Union governments. 
 
Third,  high  decision-making  thresholds  and  multiple  checks  and  balances  for  the 
adoption of legislative proposals of the executive ensure that policy outcomes are highly 
consensual. At the same time as delegating new agenda-setting powers to the European 
Union  Commission  and  extending  the  use  of  majority  voting  in  the  European  Union 
Council, the European Union governments reformed the treaty to increase the checks 




broad national and political support. In the main legislative procedure of the European 
Union,  which  is  known  as  the  co-decision  procedure,  legislative  proposals  of  the 
Commission must pass a simple majority in the Commission, an oversized-majority in 
the  Council,  and  a  simple  majority  in  the  European  Parliament.  Hence,  this  is  a  tri-
cameral legislative system. Because of the structure of representation in the European 
Union‘s legislative institutions, the procedure also guarantees that policies cannot be 
adopted  without  the  support  of  a  broad  coalition  of  both  governments  and  political 
parties.  
 
In the Council, for example, where the European Union governments are represented, 
the QMV rules ensure that an oversized-majority is required for policies to be adopted. 
Even  when  QMV  is  used,  the  European  Union  governments  prefer  to  agree  by 
consensus, as they know that they will be responsible for implementing policies once 
they  have  been  passed  and  implementation  will  be  more  difficult  if  they  have  been 
outvoted in the Council (Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
This does not mean that European Union governments give in to a majority of other 
states, but it does suggest that every government has an incentive to compromise to 
achieve a broad consensus. As a result, the proportion of decisions in the Council that 
are taken by QMV has increased, yet the proportion of decisions that are contested, in 
which at least one member state registers an opposition vote, is still rather low (less than 
20%  of  all  decisions).  And  in  most  of  these  decisions  it  is  rare  that  more  than  one 
government votes against the others (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007).  
 
In the European Parliament, meanwhile, coalitions are formed along transnational party 
lines rather than national lines. The Members of the European Parliament (MEP) have 
sat  as  transnational  political  groups,  rather  than  as  national  delegations,  since  the 
assembly  first  met  in  the  early  1950s.  Therefore,  this  practice  predates  the  first 
European  Parliament  elections  in  1979.  Moreover,  as  the  powers  of  the  European 
Parliament have increased as a result of the treaty reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
political groups have become more powerful as the incentives to organize and mobilize 
to shape European Union policies have increased. As a result, empirical research on 
voting  in  the  European  Parliament  has  demonstrated  that  while  voting  along 
transnational political lines has increased since the late 1980s, voting along national 
lines has decreased (Hix et al. 2007, 2009). In fact, since the mid-1990s, the political 
groups in the European Parliament have been as cohesive in recorded votes  in the 
chamber as the Democrats and Republicans are in votes in the US Congress.  
 
In other words, while coalitions in the Council are formed along national lines, coalitions 
in  the  European  Parliament  are  formed  issue-by-issue  around  broad  ideological 
coalitions.  This  means  that  policy  outcomes  from  the  European  Union  are  highly 
consensual, as a broad coalition of national interests and ideological views is needed for 
anything to be passed. Despite these high decision-making thresholds, the European 
Union has been able to achieve broad national and political consensus, particularly in 
the period of building the single market in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The reason for 
this  is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.  In  the  process  of  building  the  European  Union  single 
market, the main policy conflict was between those actors who wanted further economic 
integration, such as Germany and the majority of MEPs, and those who wanted less 















(that can be passed by QMV in Council) 
agreed, was no economic integration. Since the Commission was chosen by unanimous 
agreement, the government closest to the status quo (the UK) was able to force the 
other member states to accept a moderate Commission. Furthermore, with QMV in the 
European Union Council, which here we assume is two of the three states, the set of 
policies that can defeat the status quo is very large. Hence, anything the Commission 
proposed  was  then  supported  by  consensus  amongst  the  governments  and  in  the 
European Parliament. 
 
















COM = European Commission, EP = European Parliament, FRA = France, GER = Germany, SQ = status quo, UK = United 
Kingdom. 
 
Source: Author‘s illustration. 
 
 
However, this rosy picture of consensus in the European Union has changed in recent 
years. This is partly a result of European Union enlargement to 27 states, which has 
increased the number of actors in decision-making and the heterogeneity of preferences 
in the Council. A far more significant factor, however, is the shift in the European Union 
policy  agenda  from  market-building  to  economic  reform  (Hix  2008).  In  the  period  of 
market-building, decision-making was highly consensual because the status quo was 
highly undesirable for  almost all actors. In the current period of economic reform, in 
contrast, policy status quos are mostly centrally located, which means that bargaining is 
more conflictual as any policy change would produce losers. The result these days is 
often gridlock or lowest-common-denominator outcomes.  Nevertheless, this emerging 
conflict in the European Union is perhaps best understood as the gradual normalization 
of politics in the European Union, which is an inevitable result of the progression from 
regional economic integration to the building of a genuine supranational polity. 
 
In sum, economic integration beyond the nation-state is primarily an exercise in market 
regulation. The main policy aim of such regulation should be to create a level playing 
field for economic competition and to correct potential market failures. These goals are 




enforcement are delegated to an independent supranational executive, as in the case of 
the European Union Commission. Second, the potential independent action of this body 
is  restricted  though  a  particular  institutional  design,  where  (i)  unanimous 
intergovernmental agreement is needed before any policies or powers are delegated, 
and intergovernmental deals at the highest political level are used to resolve disputes 
even after delegation has taken place; (ii) the procedure for appointing the head of the 
executive and the structure of representation in the body ensure a close match between 
the preferences of the executive and the government principals; and (iii) high decision-
making  thresholds  for  the  adoption  of  policy  proposals  from  the  body  ensure  highly 
consensual outcomes. 
 
What is remarkable in the European context is that the European Union has been able to 
progress so far with such a high level of national and political consensus. This is partly 
the  result  of  a  convergence  of  preferences  between  the  governments  and  the  main 
political parties in Europe, relative to the status quo of no regional economic integration. 
However, it is also a result of the careful design of representation in the European Union 
institutions to facilitate consensus. These two aspects—preferences and institutions—
are the focus of the next two sections. 
 
 
4.  Convergent Preferences in Europe and Asia 
 
The main reason why the states of Western Europe unanimously agreed in the mid-
1980s to create a single market and delegate significant powers to the European Union 
Commission to achieve this goal was the dramatic convergence of preferences at that 
time (Moravcsik 1998). By the mid-1980s, there was a consensus in favor of a single 
market that included every major political party and political leader. On the right, the 
British conservative government of Margaret Thatcher realized that the impact of British 
privatization and deregulation would be much greater if these policies could be spread to 
the Continent. On the left, following the failure of radical socialist economic policies in 
the early 1980s, the French socialist government of François Mitterrand would turn to the 
creation  of  a  European-wide  market  as  a  way  of  promoting  the  rationalization  of 
European industry and the emergence of European industrial champions.  
 
This political consensus was also supported by a broad consensus amongst economists. 
By the mid-1980s, most economists agreed that national Keynesian models had failed, 
as these policies had not helped Europe recover from the recessions of the 1970s and 
early  1980s  as  quickly  as  the  US  and  Japan  had.  The  solution,  most  felt,  was  the 
creation of a European-wide market that would force national governments to liberalize 
their economies while leading to enormous economies of scale. For example, a group of 
economists produced a famous report, The Cost of Non-Europe, which claimed that a 
single market would add 4.5% to the gross domestic product (GDP) of European Union 
member states, reduce prices by 6.0%, and create 1.8 billion new jobs (Cecchini et al. 
1988). 
 
Multi-national  corporations  across  Europe  mobilized  to  lobby  their  governments  to 




Eurosclerosis  years  of  the  1970s,  there  was  widespread  public  enthusiasm  in  most 
countries for a renewed effort to integrate Europe. This was partly driven by optimistic 
expectations about the positive economic benefits of European integration. But, the new 
ideological commitment to European integration was also driven in the mid-1980s by 
growing antipathy in many countries to the Reagan administration in Washington. 
 
In other words, a particular and potentially unique set of factors came together in the 
mid-1980s in Western Europe to create the environment for political leaders to embark 
on  an  ambitious  program  of  regional  economic  integration.  Could  something  similar 
happen  in  East  Asia?  Tables  1  and  2  present  data  on  socio-economic  and  political 
characteristics of states in Europe and Asia, and citizens‘ preferences in the two regions. 
The most obvious inference from these data is that the level of heterogeneity in the size 
of  states  and  economies  is  much  smaller  in  the  European  Union  than  in  East  Asia 
(Kahler 2009). By global standards, the European Union has six medium-sized states of 
more or less equal size (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, and Poland) and 21 small or 
very small states. In contrast, if one takes the 16 states in the East Asian Summit there 
is  enormous  diversity,  including  the  two  most  populous  countries  on  the  planet  (the 
People‘s Republic of China [PRC] and India); one state with a huge economy but a 
medium-sized  population  (Japan);  six  states  with  either  medium-sized  economies  or 
medium-sized  populations  (Republic  of  Korea,  Indonesia,  Philippines,  Thailand,  Viet 
Nam, and Myanmar); two relatively small states with medium-sized economies (Australia 
and Malaysia); and the remaining five states with either very small economies or small 
populations,  or  both  (Singapore,  Cambodia,  Lao  People‘s  Democratic  Republic  [Lao 























Table 1: Preference Heterogeneity in the European Union 
 































Germany  82.2   2,910,490   35,407  28.3  45.4  70.5  10.0  1.78  51.4  28.2  45.4  48.0 
France  62.3   2,130,383   34,196  32.7  53.4  63.3  9.0  1.32  57.9  36.4     
United Kingdom  61.6   2,230,549   36,210  36.0  44.6  79.0  10.0  1.75  25.8  36.7     
Italy  59.9   1,814,557   30,293  36.0  50.1  61.4  10.0  0.43  60.1  72.1    56.3 
Spain  44.9   1,396,881   31,111  34.7  38.6  70.1  10.0  1.12  54.3  50.1  57.5  28.3 
Poland  38.1    666,052   17,482  34.5  43.9  60.3  9.6  0.28  66.2  83.9  50.6  48.6 
Romania  21.3    270,330   12,692  31.0  31.6  63.2  8.4  -0.17  62.6  79.1  57.1  54.8 
Netherlands  16.6    675,375   40,685  30.9  46.1  77.0  10.0  1.76  33.2  37.8     
Greece  11.2    341,127   30,458  34.3  42.3  60.8  10.0  0.65  36.4  68.3     
Portugal  10.7    235,904   22,047  38.5  46.4  64.9  10.0  0.95  51.3  76.1     
Belgium  10.6    389,518   36,747  33.0  48.9  72.1  9.8  1.52  65.8  47.6     
Czech Republic  10.4    262,169   25,209  25.4  43.6  69.4  9.6  0.77  41.0  21.4  59.3  33.0 
Hungary  10.0    196,074   19,607  26.9  51.9  66.8  10.0  0.74  50.5  41.5  34.9  44.1 
Sweden  9.2    341,869   37,160  25.0  55.6  70.4  10.0  1.90  43.6  35.0  78.2  56.1 
Austria  8.4    328,571   39,116  29.1  49.3  71.2  10.0  1.90  42.0  54.9     
Bulgaria  7.5     93,569   12,476  29.2  37.1  64.6  8.7  -0.14  42.8  47.7  46.6  34.7 
Denmark  5.5    204,060   37,102  24.7  51.5  79.6  10.0  1.95  43.8  27.0     
Slovakia  5.4    119,268   22,087  25.8  37.7  69.4  9.2  0.35  42.0  57.4  52.1  30.0 
Finland  5.3    190,862   36,012  26.9  48.8  74.5  10.0  1.87  25.2  41.9  46.1  48.5 
Ireland  4.5    188,112   41,803  34.3  34.2  82.2  10.0  1.77  49.9  76.2     
Lithuania  3.3     63,625   19,280  36.0  34.0  70.0  10.0  0.49  35.5  56.8  36.4  48.7 
Latvia  2.2     38,764   17,620  37.7  37.2  66.6  8.0  0.57  45.3  34.3  52.8  71.6 
Slovenia  2.0     59,316   29,658  28.4  45.3  62.9  10.0  0.84  49.9  36.5  49.8  41.4 
Estonia  1.3     27,207   20,928  35.8  33.0  76.4  7.0  1.00  32.4  21.6  48.7  69.8 
Cyprus  0.9     22,703   25,226  29.0  43.9  70.8  10.0  0.96  25.8  77.6    47.0 
Luxembourg  0.5     40,025   80,050  26.0  39.0  75.2    1.85  62.0  43.8     
Malta  0.4      9,806   24,515  28.0  44.1  66.1    1.55  50.9  91.2     
                         
Mean  18.4    564,710   30,192  31.0  43.6  69.6  9.6  1.10  46.2  51.2  51.1  47.6 
Standard Deviation  23.2    794,102   13,206  4.3  6.6  6.0  0.8  0.66  12.0  20.3  10.5  12.6 




Table 2: Preference Heterogeneity in Asia 
































ASEAN                         
Indonesia  230.0  908,242     3,949   34.3  20.0  53.4  6.7  -0.71  82.5  98.8  57.7  62.0 
Philippines  92.0    320,384     3,482   44.5  17.5  56.8  8.0  -0.59    96.9  64.9  55.8 
Viet Nam  88.1    240,364      2,728   34.4  27.5  51.0  0.0  -0.53  91.0  33.6  69.6  51.1 
Thailand  67.8    546,095      8,054   42.0  17.7  63.0  7.4  -0.06  73.6  94.2  47.7  71.9 
Myanmar  50.0     68,203      1,364     7.1  37.7  0.0  -1.41         
Malaysia  27.5    384,119     13,968   49.2  24.9  64.6  4.0  0.53    96.0  54.9  48.8 
Cambodia  14.8     28,239      1,908   41.7  13.5  56.6  3.0  -1.06         
Lao PDR  6.3     13,792      2,189   34.6  18.5  50.4  0.0  -0.96         
Singapore  4.7    238,755     50,799   42.5  14.4  87.1  2.0  1.79    82.0  37.9   
Brunei Darussalam  0.4     19,683     49,208           0.30         
 
Others in EA Summit                         
PRC ( incl.HKG &  
Macau, China )  1353.3  8,223,494      6,077   46.9  19.2  53.2  0.0  -0.45  82.0  9.4  68.6  73.0 
India  1198.0  3,288,345      2,745   36.8  27.2  54.4  9.0  0.10  63.5  80.7  60.0  45.0 
Japan  127.2  4,354,368     34,232   24.9  36.0  72.8  10.0  1.39    19.5  60.9  35.0 
Korea, Republic of  48.3  1,342,338     27,792   31.6  30.3  68.1  8.0  0.82  77.6  48.1  40.9  41.8 
Australia  21.3    795,305     37,338   35.2  34.5  82.6  10.0  1.79  32.3  39.3  67.3  47.4 
New Zealand  4.3    115,709     26,909   36.2  41.0  82.0  10.0  1.91    45.8  50.4  47.5 
                         
Inter-state mean (ASEAN)  58.2    276,788     13,765   40.4  17.9  57.8  3.5  -0.3  82.3  83.6  55.4  57.9 
Inter-state std. dev. 
(ASEAN)  69.5    284,411     19,472   5.5  6.1  13.5  3.3  0.9  8.7  25.2  11.5   9.3 
Inter-state mean  
(EA summit)  208.4  1,305,465     17,046   38.2  23.3  62.2  5.2  0.2  71.8  62.0  56.7  52.7 
 
HKG = Hong Kong, China; Lao PDR = Lao People‘s Democratic Republic; PRC = People‘s Republic of China. 
 
Notes and Sources: 
Pop’n = population, in millions. Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2009, World Population Prospects, Table A1, 2008 revision, United Nations. 
GDP = gross domestic product, at purchasing power party, in US$ millions. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, data for 2008. 




Income inequality (GINI) = GINI index of income inequality, from Human Development Report 2007/08, United Nations Development Programme; except for Taipei,China; 
Cyprus; Luxembourg; and Malta, which are from CIA World Factbook. 
Public spending as % GDP = total government spending as a percentage of GDP; Heritage Foundation 2009, Government Size indicator (converted back to public spending), 
from various sources. 
Economic freedom = Heritage Foundation 2009, Overall Economic Freedom Score; scale ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). 
Level  of  democracy  =  Polity  IV  democracy  score,  mean  score  1998-2007;  Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2007, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; scale ranges from 0 (lowest level of democracy) to 10 (highest level of democracy). 
Rule of law = Worldwide Governance VI rule of law, 2007, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp; scale ranges from -2.00 (least rule of law) to +2.00 (highest rule of 
law). 
Citizen of European Union/Asia = World Values Survey 2005, for Asian countries, with question for Thailand relating to ASEAN, percent who answered ―agree strongly‖ or 
―strongly‖ to the question: ―do you feel a citizen of ASEAN/Asia?‖; Eurobarometer 68 (2008) for European Union27, percent who said that they felt either ―very attached‖ or ―fairly 
attached‖ to the European Union. 
Religion is important = World Values Survey, 2005 wave, except 2000 wave for Bangladesh, PRC, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam; and European Values 
Survey, 1999 wave, for European Union27 except Cyprus; percent of respondents who said that religion was either ―very important‖ and ―somewhat important‖ for them. 
Environmental protection rather than growth = World Values Survey, 2005 wave, except 1999-2004 for Bangladesh, New Zealand, Philippines, and Singapore; percent who 
chose ―protecting the environment‖ rather than ―economic growth‖ as a priority. 
Wealth accumulation is okay = World Values Survey, 2005 wave, except 1994-99 wave for New Zealand and Philippines, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Slovakia; 10 point scale, where 1=People can only get rich at the expense of others and 10=Wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone, reporting percentage of 
respondents who answered 7 or higher on the scale. 
 




However,  these  size  imbalances  may  present  more  of  a  problem  for  the  design  of 
representative institutions, which is the subject of the next section, than whether there 
can be a convergence of basic economic, social, or political preferences in a region. On 
these issues, the data in Tables 1 and 2 present mixed evidence. Measured in terms of 
standard deviations from the inter-state means, there is not much difference in the level 
of heterogeneity in the European Union and East Asia. However, the difference between 
the highest and lowest values is larger in Asia than in the European Union for almost all 
measures. For example, the gap in GDP per capita (in terms of purchasing power parity) 
between  the  richest  and  the  poorest  three  states  in  the  European  Union27  is 
US$39,000, whereas the same gap in East Asia is US$44,000. Also, no European Union 
state has a GDP per capita of less than $10,000, while 11 states in the East Asian 
Summit are below this level. Also, the level of income inequality within states is much 
higher in East Asia than in Europe. As a result, regional economic integration in East 
Asia  must  address  issues  relating  to  the  alleviation  of  poverty  and  basic  economic 
development, whereas these are secondary issues in the European Union. 
 
The heterogeneity in terms of the political characteristics of states is also smaller  in 
Europe than in East Asia. The average level of public spending in the European Union27 
is 43.6% of GDP, with only a 6.6 standard deviation and a gap of only 20% between the 
average of the three highest public spenders (Sweden, France, and Hungary) and the 
three lowest (Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania). In East Asia, the average level of public 
spending is 23.2% of GDP, with a 9.4 standard deviation and a gap of 26.5 between the 
average of the three highest spenders (New Zealand, Japan, and Australia) and the 
three lowest (Myanmar, Cambodia, and Singapore).  
 
Moreover, the differences in public spending in the European Union are mainly related to 
economic development, with poorer states spending less than richer states, rather than 
ideological policy choices. In East Asia, in contrast, the difference in public spending 
between Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India, on the one hand, and Singapore, on 
the  other,  reflects  the  different  economic  policy  preferences  of  these  two  groups  of 
states: between more social-democratic frameworks on one side, and more neo-liberal 
frameworks  on  the  other.  These  differences  in  East  Asia  are  also  reflected  in  the 
different economic freedom scores of these states. These basic socio-economic policy 
differences will be difficult to reconcile in a common set of market regulations for the 
region,  since  despite  similar  levels  of  economic  development,  states  like  Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, and India are likely to push for higher levels of environmental 
and social standards than a state like Singapore. On the other hand, such a conflict 
might not be so different to the battles that took place in building the European Union 
single  market,  between  the  more  deregulatory  preferences  of  UK  governments  and 
preferences for higher regulation of governments in France and Germany. 
 
In terms of measures of democracy and the rule of law, the problem in East Asia may be 
less to do with the degree of heterogeneity than the fact that several states are not 
democratic, or do not have independent judicial institutions, or both. A democratic polity, 
in terms of free and fair elections, and a free press, is a prerequisite for European Union 
membership. This partly reflects some of the underlying political objectives of European 
integration:  reinforcing  democratic  institutions  against  prior  threats  of  fascism  and 




the sustainability of economic integration, as they guarantee the equal treatment and 
protection of new market entrants without which the commitment to economic integration 
is not credible. While there are some on-going issues relating to the independence of 
courts and the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania, these states are under pressure from 
the  European  Union  to  fix  these  problems,  and  all  27  European  Union  states  are 
considered to be stable functioning democracies. In contrast, in the East Asian Summit 
only 9 states can be considered to be democratic in the weakest meaning of this term: 
Australia,  India,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Malaysia,  New  Zealand,  Philippines,  Republic  of 
Korea, and Thailand. Singapore could be added to this list on the grounds that although 
elections are not as competitive, free, or fair as in most democracies, the courts and 
judiciary in Singapore are probably independent enough to support regional economic 
integration. The remaining six states (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, PRC, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and Viet Nam) are probably not democratic enough nor have they sufficiently 
independent judiciaries to credibly commit to regional economic integration beyond a 
free trade area. 
 
Turning  to  individual  citizens‘  values,  where  data  are  available  (from  World  Values 
Surveys), the variance in citizens‘ attitudes to some key issues that might arise as a 
result of regional integration are almost as great in the European Union27 as they are in 
East  Asia.  There  are  some  significant  differences  between  Europe  and  Asia.  For 
example, Europe is largely a post-religious society, which has enabled the European 
Union  to  have  common  policies  on  a  range  of  socio-political  issues,  such  as  equal 
treatment of women, the freedom to provide abortion services, and non-discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation. Still, large sections of the public in Poland, Romania, 
Cyprus,  Ireland,  Portugal,  and  Italy  remain  devout  Christians,  which  has  lead  to 
opposition  to  some  European  Union  social  policies  in  these  countries.  Religious 
heterogeneity in Asia is far greater, however. On one side are the large populations of 
practicing Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians in several countries, and on the 
other are the largely secular societies, such as the PRC, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand. This would suggest that common policies on something as basic as the equal 
treatment of women in the workplace would be much more difficult to achieve in East 
Asia than it has been in Europe. 
 
Nevertheless,  on  attitudes  towards  protection  of  the  environment  and  wealth 
accumulation, Europe and Asia look rather similar. On average, 51% of European Union 
citizens, compared with 45% of East Asians, believe that protection of the environment 
should be prioritized over economic growth. Furthermore, 48% of Europeans believe that 
wealth accumulation is socially acceptable and 57% of East Asians feel the same way, 
with the standard deviations around these averages  are  similar  in Europe and Asia. 
These sets of attitudes suggest that there might be widespread support for common 
environmental standards in East Asia, as there has been in Europe, and that it would be 
reasonable to justify regional integration in Asia as a vehicle for economic growth and 
wealth creation. 
 
Furthermore, significant populations in all East Asian countries reported in a survey in 
2005 that they identified with a wider Asian community. Not surprisingly, of the countries 
included in the survey, Australians have the weakest Asian identity, but even in Australia 




These figures compare favorably with the latest data on identification with the European 
Union amongst European citizens. On average, only 46% of citizens in an European 
Union state say that they feel they are a ―citizen of the European Union.‖ Also, there is 
significant variance across the European Union, from over 60% of the public feeling this 
way in Poland, Belgium, Romania, Luxembourg, and Italy, to less than 30% in the UK. 
This suggests that there is a potential reservoir of support for economic integration in 
East Asia. 
 
Overall, the level of political, economic, and ideological convergence is lower in East 
Asia  than  in  Europe.  Some  of  the  huge  differences  in  scale  among  the  states  and 
economies in the region could be addressed through the careful institutional design of 
representation  in  some  common  institutions,  as  the  next  section  will  explain. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether there is sufficient convergence in terms of political 
practices,  judicial  independence,  and  public  and  elite  attitudes  towards  individual 
economic rights to underpin an ambitious economic integration project encompassing all 
the states in East Asia. 
 
There is one important caveat to this conclusion.  Although a basic level of  common 
preferences about the free market and minimum social and environmental standards 
might be a prerequisite for regional economic integration, convergence on a range of 
other issues and political practices might in fact be endogenous to regional integration. 
For  example,  it  has  been  a  conscious  strategy  in  Europe  to  use  European  Union 
enlargement  to  extend  and  strengthen  democratic  government,  the  rule  of  law,  free 
markets, and liberal social values. Therefore, the spread of democracy, the rule of law, 
free  markets,  and  liberalism  might  be  a  product  of,  rather  than  a  prerequisite  for, 
economic integration in East Asia. 
 
 
5.  Rules for Adopting Policies: Weighted Council Voting and a 
Regional Parliament 
 
Given the huge variance in the size of the states in East  Asia,  it may at first seem 
impossible to design a workable system of representation in a regional organization. 
However, it is possible to design a system of weighted voting in a council of states that 
both balances equitable representation for all states and constrains the PRC and India. 
In  the  1940s,  Lionel  Penrose,  an  English  mathematician,  came  up  with  what  many 
scientists still consider to be the fairest system of allocating voting power to states in an 
intergovernmental body. Penrose‘s starting assumption was that every citizen in every 
state should have an equal chance of being on the winning side in a vote. If votes are 
exercised en bloc, and coalitions between states are formed randomly, then Penrose 
proved mathematically that the only way to achieve true equality is if the voting power of 
each state is equal to some common divisor of the square-root of a state‘s population 
(Penrose 1946).  
 
To understand the intuition behind this proposition consider how powerful each state 
would be if each state had an allocation of votes in direct proportion to its population 




side than their population share would warrant. For example, a state with just over 50% 
of the population would be on the winning side 100% of the time if a simple majority 
were required. So, Penrose proposed that voting weights should be allocated to states in 
proportion  to  their  size,  but  in  declining  proportions,  through  a  system  known  in 
European Union circles as digressive proportionality. And the best way of applying a 
system of digressive proportionality is to use the square-root of each state‘s population. 
 
Largely by chance, the European Union founding fathers designed a system of QMV in 
the European Union Council, which fits Penrose‘s logic almost perfectly (Table 3). Under 
the QMV system, which applied to the European Union15 between 1995 and 2003, each 
state had a certain number of bloc votes. There were 87 votes in total and a majority of 
62 votes (71% of the total) was required for a decision to pass. Assuming that coalitions 
formed  randomly,  this  system  of  QMV  meant  that  the  largest  states  had  an  11.2% 
chance of being pivotal, while the smallest state (Luxembourg) had a 2.3% chance. Put 
another way, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK were about twice as powerful as the 
Netherlands,  Greece,  Portugal,  or  Belgium;  and  about  five  times  as  powerful 
Luxembourg (Banzhaf 1965). 
 
 
Table 3: Representation in the European Union15 Institutions—The Rome 
Design 
 
Member state  Pop'n(m)  Commissioners  MEPs  Votes  Voting 
Power 
Inclusiveness 
Germany  82.2  2  99  10  11.2  86.3 
France  62.3  2  87  10  11.2  86.3 
United Kingdom  61.6  2  87  10  11.2  86.3 
Italy  59.9  2  87  10  11.2  86.3 
Spain  44.9  2  64  8  9.2  80.0 
Netherlands  16.6  1  31  5  5.9  69.1 
Greece  11.2  1  25  5  5.9  69.1 
Portugal  10.7  1  25  5  5.9  69.1 
Belgium  10.6  1  25  5  5.9  69.1 
Sweden  9.2  1  22  4  4.8  65.6 
Austria  8.4  1  21  4  4.8  65.6 
Denmark  5.5  1  16  3  3.6  61.7 
Finland  5.3  1  16  3  3.6  61.7 
Ireland  4.5  1  15  3  3.6  61.7 
Luxembourg  0.5  1  6  2  2.3  57.4 
Total  393.4  20  626  87  100.0   
QMV threshold in the Council 
     
62  
(71.3%)     
 
Note: ―Voting power‖ is the normalized Banzhaf index, which calculates the proportion of times a state will be pivotal in a 
vote. ―Inclusiveness‖ is a measure of the proportion of times a state is likely to be on the winning side in a vote. These 
indices are calculated using the voting weights in the Council in the table and the assumption that 62 votes are required 
for a qualified majority to be achieved.  
 
Source: IOP2.0.2 software (Banzhaf 1965; König and Bräuninger 1998; Bräuninger and König, 2005).  
 




Another way of conceptualizing the power of an actor in a decision-making body is to 
look at the proportion of all coalitions within which an actor would be on the winning side 
in a vote under a given set of rules. This is known as the Inclusiveness Index (König and 
Bräuninger 1998). As Table 3 shows, the Rome Design of QMV in the European Union 
Council meant that the largest states were in 86% of all potential winning coalitions, the 
majority of states were in at least two-thirds of all winning coalitions, and the smallest 
state (Luxembourg) was in 50% of potential winning coalitions. Put together, these two 
measures consequently illustrate how all  European Union  states felt that they had a 
reasonable chance of influencing policy outcomes in the main decision-making body at 
the European level. 
 
However, the European Union has not kept the Rome model of voting in the Council. 
First, in the Nice Treaty, which entered into force in 2003, the member states changed 
the system in anticipation of European Union enlargement in 2004. In return for losing 
one of their two Commissioners, and because most of the prospective new member 
states were small, the large member states insisted that a new system of voting should 
be used to boost their power relative to the small states. The resulting system allocated 
29 votes  to the largest four states, and introduced a total of 345 votes and a QMV 
threshold of 255 votes (Table 4). However, this system meant that the largest states 
were still approximately twice as powerful as the medium-sized states and five times as 
powerful as the very small states.  
 
In the process of negotiating a Constitution for Europe and the resulting Lisbon Treaty, 
the issue of voting weights in the Council became highly politicized. Germany felt that it 
was  underrepresented,  while  many  of  the  medium-sized  states  felt  that  Spain  and 
Poland were overrepresented (as a result of the deal that Spain had secured in the Nice 
Treaty in return for giving up a Commissioner). The governments eventually agreed on a 
double-majority  system,  where  to  adopt  a  measure  in  the  Council  a  majority  must 
comprise  55%  of  the  states  (15  out  of  the  current  27)  as  well  as  65%  of  the  total 
European Union population. 
 
At face value this sounds  like a simple way of balancing a majority of states and a 
majority  of  populations.  However,  in  reality  such  a  system  over-represents  the  large 
states as well as the very small states. A majority based purely on population means that 
large states are more powerful than they should be (as Penrose discovered), and  a 
majority  based  on  one-state-one-vote  means  that  tiny  states  have  exactly  the  same 
power  as  all  the  other  states.  Realizing  this,  during  the  European  Union  treaty 
negotiations a large number of social and natural scientists supported a proposal by two 
Polish scientists, known as the Jagiellonian Compromise, to base the voting system in 
the Council on the ideas of Penrose. Sadly, the European Union governments refused to 
listen  to  the  scientists.  Figure 5  illustrates  the  difference  between  the  Rome,  Nice, 









Table 4: Representation in the European Union27:  




















Germany  82.2  1  99  96  29  7.8  11.6  9.4 
France  62.3  1  78  74  29  7.8  9.0  8.3 
United 
Kingdom  61.6  1  78  73  29  7.8  8.7  8.1 
Italy  59.9  1  78  73  29  7.8  8.5  8.0 
Spain  44.9  1  54  51  27  7.4  6.5  6.9 
Poland  38.1  1  54  54  27  7.4  5.7  6.4 
Romania  21.3  1  35  33  14  4.3  4.2  4.9 
Netherlands  16.6  1  27  26  13  4.0  3.5  4.2 
Greece  11.2  1  24  22  12  3.7  2.9  3.5 
Portugal  10.7  1  24  22  12  3.7  2.8  3.4 
Belgium  10.6  1  24  22  12  3.7  2.8  3.4 
Czech 
Republic  10.4  1  24  22  12  3.7  2.8  3.3 
Hungary  10.0  1  24  22  12  3.7  2.7  3.3 
Sweden  9.2  1  19  20  10  3.1  2.6  3.1 
Austria  8.4  1  18  19  10  3.1  2.5  3.0 
Bulgaria  7.5  1  18  18  10  3.1  2.5  2.9 
Denmark  5.5  1  14  13  7  2.2  2.2  2.4 
Slovakia  5.4  1  14  13  7  2.2  2.2  2.4 
Finland  5.3  1  14  13  7  2.2  2.2  2.4 
Ireland  4.5  1  13  12  7  2.2  2.0  2.1 
Lithuania  3.3  1  13  12  7  2.2  1.9  1.9 
Latvia  2.2  1  9  9  4  1.3  1.8  1.6 
Slovenia  2.0  1  7  8  4  1.3  1.8  1.5 
Estonia  1.3  1  6  6  4  1.3  1.7  1.2 
Cyprus  0.9  1  6  6  4  1.3  1.6  0.9 
Luxembourg  0.5  1  6  6  4  1.3  1.6  0.7 
Malta  0.4  1  5  6  3  0.9  1.6  0.7 
Total  496.2  27  785  751  345  100.0  100.0  100.0 
62%=  307.6        255       
 
Note: The qualified majority voting rules in the European Union Council under the various treaties are as follows: (i) Nice 
Treaty: (a) 255 out of 345 votes plus (b) 50% of the member state (14 out of 27), which (c) must constitute at least 62% of 
total European Union population; (ii) Lisbon Treaty: (a) 55% of the member states (15 out of 27) and (b) 65% of total 
European  Union  population;  and  (iii)  Jagiellonian  compromise:  This  was  a  proposal  put  to  the  European  Union 
governments  by  a  number  of  natural  and  social  scientists,  where  the  voting  weight  of  a  member  state  would  be 
proportional to the square-root of the member state‘s population, and the required threshold would be 61.6% of the total 
votes (Slomczynski and Zyczkowski 2007). ―Voting power‖ is the normalized Banzhaf power index, calculated using the 
IOP2.0.2 software (Banzhaf 1965, and Bräuninger and König 2005); Voting power in the European Union institutions from 
Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2007). 
 









Figure 5: Voting Power in the European Union Council 













































Note: The graph shows the normalized Banzhaf Voting Power of an European Union 
member state in the European Union Council under the Rome Treaty, Nice Treaty, 
Lisbon Treaty, and the proposed Jagellonian Compromise (based on the square-root 
of a country‘s population). The lines in the figure are bivariate quadratic regression 
lines. 
Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat (as in Table 1) and various EU 
treaties (see Table 4).   
 
East Asia can learn a lot from the experience of the design of representation in the 
European Union. Table 5 presents three possible representational designs for an East 
Asian  Economic  Union:  (i)  10  states  in  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN);
1 (ii) 13 states in the ASEAN+3 arrangement (ASEAN plus the PRC, Japan, 
and Republic of Korea); and (iii) 16 members of the East Asian Summit. First off, an 
independent Executive should have representatives from every state, with perhaps an 
extra representative from the largest state or states in each organization. Second, the 
number of bloc votes  in a Council and seats in a Parliament should be allocated in 
proportion to the square-root of each state‘s population, following Penrose‘s logic. To 
keep things simple, each of these designs assumes a total of 100 votes in a Council with 
a winning threshold of 67 votes (two-thirds majority), and 250 seats in a Parliament. In 
the table, the voting power of a state in the Council is the proportion of times a state is 
pivotal  in  turning  a  losing  coalition  into  a  winning  coalition  (Banzhaf  1965),  and 
inclusiveness is the proportion of times a state is on the winning side out of all potential 
coalitions that could form in the Council (König and Bräuninger 1998). 
 
 
                                                 
1    ASEAN comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, 




Table 5: Possible Representation in an East Asian Economic Union 
 
  ASEAN  ASEAN+3  EAST ASIAN SUMMIT (ASEAN+6) 
Country  Popn 




ness  Exec  Cncl  Parl  Voting 
power 
Inclusive- 




Indonesia  230.0  2  24  59  24.0  93.8  2  13  32  14.7  76.1  1   9  24   7.7  63.9 
Philippines  92.0  1  15  38  15.2  77.7  1   8  20  8.2  64.6  1   6  15   5.3  59.6 
Viet Nam  88.1  1  15  37  15.2  77.7  1   8  20  8.2  64.6  1   6  15   5.3  59.6 
Thailand  67.8  1  13  32  13.1  73.9  1   7  17  7.2  62.7  1   5  13   4.4  58.0 
Myanmar  50.0  1  11  28  11.0  70.1  1   6  15  6.1  57.3  1   5  11   4.4  58.0 
Malaysia  27.5  1   8  21   7.7  64.0  1   4  11  4.1  55.2  1   3   8   2.7  54.9 
Cambodia  14.8  1   6  15   6.1  61.1  1   3   8  3.0  55.2  1   2   6   1.8  53.3 
Lao PDR  6.3  1   4  10   4.0  57.3  1   2   5  2.0  53.5  1   2   4   1.8  53.3 
Singapore  4.7  1   3   8   2.7  55.0  1   2   5  2.0  53.5  1   1   3   0.9  51.6 
Brunei Darussalam  0.4  1   1   2   0.9  51.7  1   1   1  1.0  51.7  1   1   1   0.9  51.6 
PRC (incl. HKG 
& Macau, China)  1353.3            2  31  77  28.1  99.8  2  23  57  26.0  97.2 
Japan  127.2            2   9  24   9.3  66.5  1   7  18   6.1  61.1 
Korea, Republic of  48.3            1   6  15   6.1  60.9  1   4  11   3.6  56.5 
India  1198.0                      2  22  54  25.5  96.2 
Australia  21.3                      1   3   7   2.7  54.9 
New Zealand  4.3                      1   1   3   0.9  51.6 
Total  3548.5  11  100  250  100.0    16  100  250  100.0    18  100  250  100.0   
 
HKG = Hong Kong, China; Lao PDR = Lao People‘s Democratic Republic; PRC = People‘s Republic of China. 
Popn = Population, Exec = Executive, Cncl = Council, Parl = Parliament. 
 
Note: ―Voting power‖ is the normalized Banzhaf index, which calculates the proportion of times a state will be pivotal in a vote. ―Inclusiveness‖ is a measure of the proportion 
of times a state is likely to be on the winning side in a vote. These indices are calculated using the voting weights in the Council in the table and the assumption that a two-
thirds majority (67 votes) is required for a qualified-majority to be achieved.  
 
Source: Calculated using the IOP2.0.2 software (Banzhaf 1965, König and Bräuninger 1998, Bräuninger and König, 2005).  













European United Left/Nordic Green Left (radical left) 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (social democrats) 
Greens/European Free Alliance (greens and left regionalists) 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (liberals and centrists) 
European People's Party (Christian democrats and conservatives) 
European Conservatives and Reformists (anti-European conservatives) 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (Populist anti-Europeans) 
non-attached MEPs (mostly extreme right) 
Regarding  representation  in  a  Council,  the  most  important  conclusion  to  draw  from 
Table 5 is that it would be possible to design a system of weighted bloc voting in East 
Asia that would both fairly represent each state and also prevent the PRC and/or India 
from dominating the organization. For example, in the scenario of an East Asian Summit 
organization, the PRC and India would have approximately five times more voting power 
than Japan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, but together the PRC and India would need 
at least two other medium-sized states, or all eight of the smallest states, to join them to 
reach the 62 vote threshold. At the other extreme, even the smallest states could expect 
to be on the winning side in about 50% of the coalitions that could form. 
 
Finally, to maximize the degree of consensus in the adoption of policies, an East Asian 
regional organization should also have a Parliament, perhaps based on delegations from 
national  legislatures  as  the  European  Parliament  was  before  1979.  An  East  Asian 
Parliament  should  operate  through  transnational  political  groups—again,  like  the 
European  Parliament—rather  than  through  national  delegations.  This  might  seem 
fanciful, but with a little creativity it might not be impossible to achieve in East Asia and 
could even lead to more checks and balances in the adoption of policies proposed by an 
independent Executive. Such a Parliament would also be an important counter-weight to 
a qualified majority in a Council. This is why the European Union founding fathers set up 
an  assembly  at  the  European  level,  composed  of  delegates  from  the  national 
parliaments  (Rittberger  2005).  The  powers  of  the  European  Parliament  were  also 
extended in the mid-1980s at the same time as QMV was extended in the European 
Union  Council,  as  the  states  realized  that  increasing  the  power  of  the  European 
Parliament would present a check on a Council majority and the new agenda-setting 
power of the Commission. Also, by establishing a supranational Parliament, it increases 
the probability that a section of the elite from a state  would be on the winning side 
somewhere  in  the  decision-making  system.  For  example,  if  a  center-left government 
voted  against  a  proposal  to  liberalize  a  particular  market  in  a  Council,  the 
representatives  from  the  opposition  center-right  party  from  the  same  state  would  be 
likely to vote in favor of the proposal in a Parliament.  
 
















Source: Author's calculations based on European Parliament data. 




Figure 6  shows the  composition  of the current European Parliament after the direct 
elections  in  June  2009.  The  European  People‘s  Party,  which  comprises  most  of  the 
mainstream parties on the center-right in Europe, is the largest political group, and the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, which brings together all the parties 
on the center-left in Europe, is the second largest political group. Together, these two 
groups dominate politics in the European Parliament. However, the centrist Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats is often pivotal in the formation of a center-right majority on 
market liberalization issues, and a center-left majority on environmental and civil liberties 
questions. 
 
A Parliament broadly modeled on the pre-1979 European Parliament could be set up in 
East Asia, as a counter-weight to a Council and an Executive, as Figure 7 illustrates. To 
produce this figure, three assumptions have been made: (i) each state has the same 
allocation  of  seats  as  listed  in  the  Parliament  column  of  the  East  Asian  Summit 
representation design in Table 5, (ii) seats are allocated to national parties in proportion 
to their current representation in national parliaments, and (iii) national party delegations 
would choose to sit with like-minded politicians from other countries in political groups. 
This last assumption is not inconceivable since many parties in East Asia are already 
members  of  an  international  party  union,  such as  the  Council  of  Asian  Liberals  and 
Democrats,  the  Socialist  International,  the  International  Democratic  Union,  or  the 
Centrist Democratic Union.  
 
To  illustrate  how  this  might  work,  the  54  Indian  members  of  the  Parliament  would 
comprise  28  members  from  the  Congress  Party,  who  choose  to  sit  in  a  group  of 
Progressives;  17  from  the  Bharatiya  Janata  Party,  who  choose  to  sit  in  a  group  of 
Conservatives; and 9 members from the Communist Party of India, who choose to sit 
separately from the PRC Communists and their allies. The overall result would be a fairly 
evenly-balanced  assembly,  with  three  main  groups:  a  center-right  group 
(Conservatives), a liberal/center-left group (Progressives), and a group representing the 
PRC Communist Party and its allied parties. There would also be several Islamists from 
Indonesia as well as Independent Communists from India. These political groups are 
unlikely to be as cohesive in their voting behavior as the political groups in the European 
Parliament.  Nevertheless,  creating  a  Parliament  which  brings  together  elected 
representatives  from  across  the  region  could  play  a  critical  role  in  facilitating  the 
compromises  and  deals  that  would  need  to  be  made  to  move  economic  integration 





























  Political Group   
Country  Independent 
Communists 
PRC Communists 
and Allies  Progressives  Conservatives  Islamists  Total 
PRC    57        57 
India  9    28  17    54 
Indonesia      5  5  14  24 
Japan      12  6    18 
Philippines      3  12    15 
Viet Nam    15        15 
Thailand      7  6    13 
Myanmar    11        11 
Korea, Rep. of      3  8    11 
Malaysia      3  5    8 
Australia      4  3    7 
Cambodia    4  1  1    6 
Lao PDR    4        4 
Singapore      1  2    3 
New Zealand      1  2    3 
Brunei 
Darussalam        1    1 
Total Seats  9  91  68  68  14  250 
Percent  3.6  36.4  27.2  27.2  5.6   
PRC = People‘s Republic of China. 
Note: The numbers of seats are calculated on the basis of the proportion of seats held by each political party in each 
state‘s  national  parliament. The membership  of  the  political  groups  is  determined  by the  policy  positions  of  national 
political parties and their membership in international party organizations, such as the Council of Asian Liberals and 
Democrats, the Socialist International, the International Democratic Union, or the Centrist Democratic Union. 
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6.  Current Institutions in East Asia and the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization 
 
This discussion might seem rather abstract and unrealistic to policy-makers in East Asia 
and to economists and political scientists who are regional experts. Furthermore, East 
Asia is one of the regions in the world with the least developed supranational institutions 
when compared with Europe, South America, or Central America. ASEAN, ASEAN+3, 
and  the  East  Asian  Summit  remain  intergovernmental  arrangements  as  opposed  to 
supranational  institutions.  Despite  the  goal  of  creating  a  European-style  economic 
community among ASEAN members by 2015, there has been little institutional progress 
in terms of either the delegation of agenda-setting and enforcement to an independent 
body,  or  the  introduction  of  majority-voting  between  the  governments  to  enable 
legislation to be passed to facilitate the creation of a genuine single market. Many of the 
governments in ASEAN are clearly reluctant to take the next step. One possibility is that 
delegation and supranational design-making, which inevitably involves the formalization 
of rules and a degree of majoritarianism, is fundamentally incompatible with the highly 
consensual and informal nature of decision-making in ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and the East 
Asian Summit. 
 
Beyond  these  three  multilateral  intergovernmental  structures,  a  dense  network  of 
bilateral  free  trade  agreements  has  developed  rapidly  in  the  last  decade  between 
ASEAN and third states, and between individual members of ASEAN and other states in 
the region and beyond. These bilateral free trade agreements, if implemented, would 
further liberalize trade in the region, and perhaps make the need for a European-style 
single market program redundant. 
 
There are, however, several reasons to believe that these bilateral free trade deals are 
not  a  substitute  for  genuine  economic  integration  in  East  Asia.  First,  the  aggregate 
benefits from these agreements are likely to be limited given the low levels of tariffs and 
the  exclusion  of  certain  politically-sensitive  sectors  in  most  arrangements 
(Ravenhill 2009). Second, even if these bilateral trade deals do promote further trade 
liberalization, removing barriers to the free movement of goods and services is likely to 
increase pressure for the adoption of some common standards to prevent distortions in 
competition or  to establish a level playing field in terms of social and environmental 
standards, as was the case in Europe. The pressure for common standards is likely to 
come from the states with the highest domestic standards, such as Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand, who fear a race-to-the-bottom. 
 
Furthermore, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) demonstrates that with 
sufficient  incentives,  the  states  in  East  Asia  are  willing  to  allow  the  development  of 
genuinely  supranational  institutional  arrangements  in  the  region.  The  CMIM  is  an 
initiative  under  the  ASEAN+3  framework  that  establishes  a  system  of bilateral  swap 
arrangements. The Chiang Mai Initiative was set up after the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis to manage short-term liquidity problems in the region and to facilitate the work of 
other international financial arrangements, such as the International Monetary Fund. In 
February 2009, ASEAN+3 members agreed to pool US$120 billion for this purpose, and 




The memo from the meeting of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers in May 2009 states: ―On 
[the] decision-making mechanism of the CMIM, the fundamental issues will be decided 
through consensus of members of ASEAN+3, while the lending issues will be decided 
through majority.‖ The specific rules governing how this majority decision-making will 
operate are still unclear. However, this is a historic agreement, as it is the first time that 
sovereign states in East Asia have allowed majoritarian decision-making rules to govern 
any aspect of their relations. Although the CMIM is in the area of financial integration, 
and although the majority decision-making aspect of the CMIM is restricted to currency 
lending issues, the establishment of this majority-based mechanism suggests that East 
Asian states might be willing to allow similar rules to be used on other technical aspects 
of economic integration, such as on the harmonization of product standards, packaging 
and labeling, or health and safety in the workplace. 
 
Table  6  presents  an  analysis  of  representation  and  state  power  under  the  potential 
decision-making  rules  of  the  CMIM.  Each  group  of  columns  assumes  a  different 
structure of decision-making, where a majority threshold of 60.01 out of 120 is required 
and voting weights are either based on the (i) contributions to the CMIM fund, (ii) square-
root of the population of each state, (iii) square-root of the nominal GDP of each state, or 
(iv) square-root of the currency reserves of each state (the Penrose formula).  
 
If decision-making were based on the contributions of the states to the CMIM fund and 
votes cast by individual states rather than by regional blocs, then the three states with 
the largest contributions (the PRC, Japan, and Republic of Korea) would have far more 
voting power than their share of contributions would suggest. For example, Republic of 
Korea has contributed slightly more than four times what Indonesia has contributed to 
the CMIM fund–US$19.20 billion compared with $4.77 billion—yet voting weights based 
on these amounts would mean that Republic of Korea would be 15 times more likely to 
be pivotal in decision-making than Indonesia. However, the picture is very different if one 
assumes that the 10 ASEAN states vote as a single bloc. If this were the case, then 
Republic of Korea would have zero power, as it would never be pivotal, since coalitions 
of ASEAN–PRC, ASEAN–Japan, or PRC–Japan would each comprise a majority without 
Republic of Korea. Furthermore, a coalition of Republic of Korea with any other state 
would need a third actor to form a majority. Nevertheless, Republic of Korea would be on 
the winning side in 50% of the coalitions that could be formed between these four actors. 
The power relations might be different under alternative representational arrangements. 
For  example,  if  voting  were  based  on  population  size,  the  PRC  would  of  course 
dominate proceedings, while decision-making based on GDP size or currency reserves 







































By country                 
PRC   38.40  32.00  1.60  38.40  40.00  28.41  29.10  77.16 
Japan  38.40  32.00  1.60  38.40  40.00  28.41  29.10  77.16 
Korea, Rep. of  19.20  16.00  1.60  19.20  20.80  14.77  22.07  70.60 
Indonesia  4.77  3.98  1.60  4.77  6.37  4.52  3.49  53.26 
Malaysia  4.77  3.98  1.60  4.77  6.37  4.52  3.49  53.26 
Singapore  4.77  3.98  1.60  4.77  6.37  4.52  3.49  53.26 
Thailand  4.77  3.98  1.60  4.77  6.37  4.52  3.49  53.26 
Philippines  3.68  3.07  1.60  3.68  5.28  3.75  2.55  52.38 
Viet Nam  1.00  0.83  1.60  1.00  2.60  1.85  1.35  51.26 
Cambodia  0.12  0.10  1.60  0.12  1.72  1.22  1.06  50.99 
Myanmar  0.06  0.05  1.60  0.06  1.66  1.18  1.04  50.96 
Brunei 
Darussalam  0.03  0.03  1.60  0.03  1.63  1.16  1.03  50.96 
Lao PDR  0.03  0.03  1.60  0.03  1.63  1.16  1.03  50.96 
By group                 
ASEAN  24.00  20.00  16.00  24.00  40.00  28.41  33.33  75.00 
PRC  38.40  32.00  1.60  38.40  40.00  28.41  33.33  75.00 
Japan  38.40  32.00  1.60  38.40  40.00  28.41  33.33  75.00 
Korea, Rep. of  19.20  16.00  1.60  19.20  20.80  14.77  0.00  50.00 
Total  120.00  100.00  20.80  120.00  140.80  100.00  100.00   
 
Note: ‗Voting power‘ is the normalised Banzhaf index, which calculates the proportion of times a state will be pivotal in a 
vote. ‗Inclusiveness‘ is a measure of the proportion of times a state is likely to be on the winning side in a vote. These 
indices are calculated using the Dollar contributions as the voting weights and the assumption that decisions require a 
simple majority (70.41 out of 140.80 votes) to pass. These indices were calculated using the IOP2.0.2 software (Banzhaf 















7.  Conclusion 
 
In the early 1980s it would have been hard to imagine that in 25 years there would be a 
single  market  in  Europe  stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  border  of  Russia  and 
encompassing almost 500 million people. It would have been equally difficult to predict 
that  (i)  the  European  Commission  would  be  a  powerful  supranational  executive,  (ii) 
27 European Union governments would take most decisions by a majority vote, and (iii) 
the European Parliament would have co-equal power with governments in the adoption 
of rules governing Europe‘s single market.  
 
Could something similar happen in East Asia in the next 25 years? One big difference 
between these two regions is that in Europe in the mid-1980s there was a convergence 
of  preferences  amongst  governments,  businesses,  and  citizens  around  the  goal  of 
creating  a  single  continental-scale  market.  This  enabled  the  governments  to 
unanimously agree to delegate new agenda-setting powers to the Commission, and to 
change  the  rules  of  engagement  in  the  Council  and  between  the  Council  and  the 
Parliament, to allow for more majority decisions, but with new checks and balances.  
 
East  Asia may be too heterogeneous in terms of population,  economic size,  wealth, 
democracy, the rule of law, and citizens‘ values—let alone the deep historical rivalries 
and suspicions in the region—for states to converge around such an ambitious project. 
Nevertheless, states in East Asia need not fear delegation to an independent agent if the 
institutional arrangements are designed carefully to limit the independent authority of an 
independent  body,  ensure  a  high  level  of  consensus,  and  provide  equitable 
representation between the states involved. 
 
If a group of states in the region can agree on a common economic integration project, it 
is not beyond the wit of a woman to design an institutional architecture to fit the East 
Asian  environment.  The  basic  elements  of  the  architecture  might  include  (i)  an 
independent  Executive,  responsible  for  policy  initiatives  and  the  oversight  of  policy 
implementation; (ii) a set of mechanisms to limit the autonomous action of this body, 
such as unanimous agreement amongst the states before delegating to this body and 
representation of all states in the Executive; and (iii) a legislative authority, including a 
Council  acting  by  a  system  of  weighted-bloc  voting,  and  a  Parliament  composed  of 
delegates from national parliaments. 
 
Indeed, the experience of Europe in the past 25 years suggests that regional integration 
is at least partly endogenous to the institutional design of the project. When signing the 
Single  European  Act  in  the mid-1980s, most  European governments  could  not  have 
predicted how quickly the new  institutional framework would get  to work, or how far 
European integration would reach into other policy areas. If a group of states in East 
Asia could start the ball rolling, economic integration beyond a free trade area could 
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system of representation can be established. Several institutional scenarios for an "Asian
economic union" are considered.
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